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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Respondent agrees with the Appellant's Statement of Jurisdiction which appears 
on page 4 of her Brief. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether Joseph Mark's change of beneficiary on his Beneficial Life 
insurance policies from his former wife to his new wife was valid. No deference to trial court's 
legal conclusion, reviewed for correctness. Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort. 808 P.2d 1037 (Ut. 
1991) Hamblin v. Citv of Clearfield. 795 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1990) 
2. Whether the proceeds of the two (2) life insurance policies belong to Ruby 
Mark. No deference to trial court's legal conclusion, reviewed for correctness. Clover v. 
Snowbird Ski Resort. 808 P.2d 1037 (Ut. 1991) Hamblin v. Citv of Clearfield. 795 P.2d 1133 
(Utah 1990) 
3. Whether Julie Mark has standing to properly raise the issues of laches and 
unclean hands on the part of Ruby Mark. No deference to trial court's legal conclusion, 
reviewed for correctness. Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort. 808 P.2d 1037 (Ut. 1991) Hamblin 
v. Citv of Clearfield. 795 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1990) 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a appeal from an action commenced by Ruby Mark to determine the 
rightful beneficiary of the proceeds from two (2) life insurance policies covering the life of her 
ex-husband, Joseph Mark. Ruby Mark sued Appellant, Julie Mark, in the district court asking 
the District Court to determine that Ruby Mark was the proper beneficiary on the life insurance 
policies and that Joseph Mark's change of the beneficiary to his new wife, Julie Mark, contrary 
to the provisions of the Decree of Divorce between the parties was void. Julie Mark 
counterclaimed and also sought Summary Judgment against Ruby Mark. The court ruled in 
favor of Ruby Mark, denied Julie Mark's Summary Judgment and this Appeal by Julie Mark 
followed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant, Julie Mark, seeks a reversal of the trial court's Order granting 
Summary Judgment in favor of Ruby Mark. Appellee seeks affirmance of the lower court's 
Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT ON APPEAL 
Appellee, Ruby Mark, (hereinafter referred to as "Ruby") and Joseph Mark, 
(hereinafter referred to as "Joseph") were divorced in 1980. (R. 0006-0008) 
The Decree of Divorce at paragraph 6 provides that Ruby is to remain as 
beneficiary on Joseph's life insurance policies until such time as she dies or remarries, 
whichever occurs first. (R. 0006-0008) 
The Decree of Divorce was never changed or modified. 
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Ruby has not died and has not remarried. (R. 0034-0035) 
After the divorce from Ruby, Joseph married Appellant, Julie Mark, and on or 
about 1986, Joseph, without permission or authority from Ruby changed the beneficiary of his 
life insurance policies from Ruby to Appellant. (R. 0102-0104) 
Julie Mark is the Co-Personal Representative of the estate of Joseph Mark along 
with Charlene Mayfield. (R. 0125-0126, 0121-0123 and 0124). 
Julie Mark in her personal and not her capacity as Co-Personal Representative 
filed the Counterclaim below and makes these claims on appeal. (R. 0016-0029, 0152 and 
Appellant's Brief, P.8). 
The Co-Personal Representatives, Charlene Mayfield, is not a party to the action 
below nor to this appeal and is not in agreement with the claims made by Julie Mark. (R. 0016-
0020, 0152). 
The amount of the benefit of the life insurance policies was the same on the date 
of death of Joseph as it was at the time of the divorce. (R. 0034-0035) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Pursuant to §75-3-716, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended1, the 
concurrence of a majority of the personal representatives of an estate is required on all acts 
connected with the administration and distribution of the estate. Thus, Appellant, in acting alone 
has no standing in her personal capacity to raise issues or assert rights of Joseph such as Ruby's 
alleged non-compliance with the Decree of Divorce 
1
 All statutory references are to the Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended. 
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2. As a matter of well-settled Utah law, if pursuant to a Decree of Divorce, 
a spouse or others are to remain beneficiaries of an insurance policy, any unauthorized change 
is void. Since there was no court authority authorizing the change of beneficiary on the policy 
to Appellant, the change is void. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONCLUDING THAT JULIE MARK HAD NO 
STANDING TO RAISE ISSUES OF ALLEGED NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE 
DECREE OF DIVORCE BY RUBY AND THAT SUCH ISSUES MUST BE RAISED 
BY THE CO-PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES OF JOSEPH'S ESTATE. 
Julie Mark brought her counterclaim and the various affirmative defenses 
personally and not in her representative capacity as co-personal representative of Joseph's estate. 
(R. 0016-0020 and Appellant's Brief, P. 8) This is readily seen by the pleadings and headings 
in the case wherein Julie Mark alone, in her personal capacity, appears as the interested party. 
At no time has she claimed nor filed any pleadings stating that she is making the claims on 
behalf of Joseph's estate. 
However, notwithstanding the fact appellant acted only in her personal capacity, 
she raised in the trial court issues and claims that belong solely to the estate of Joseph, all in a 
misguided attempt to defeat Ruby's claim to the insurance proceeds. Julie Mark's claims can 
be boiled down essentially to this: Joseph Mark changed the beneficiary of the insurance 
policies from Ruby to Julie Mark in order to convince Ruby to give him personal property Julie 
Mark believes Ruby wrongfully withheld from Joseph. (Appellant's Brief, page 6). In other 
words, Julie Mark believes Ruby breached the Decree of Divorce and should therefore be denied 
the insurance proceeds. 
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The law in Utah as it relates to the authority of co-personal representatives is 
clear. In 75-3-716, it provides: 
"If two or more persons are appointed co-representatives and unless 
the will provides otherwise, the concurrence of a majority is 
required on all acts connected with the administration and 
distribution of the estate." 
Joseph's will did not provide otherwise. (R. 0121-0123) The raising of an 
alleged claim that would have been the decedent's alone to raise before his death is an act 
"connected with the administration and distribution of the estate." Such an alleged claim of 
wrong-doing and withholding of personal property against his former wife clearly is an asset of 
his estate that is subject to the Utah Uniform Probate Code, §75-3-714(1), (17) and (22). Those 
sections provide that a personal representative may retain assets of the decedent or may 
compromise and settle any claim with any debtor or obligor and prosecute or defend claims or 
proceedings for the protection of the estate. The Probate Code in §75-3-101 makes it clear that 
any such claim the decedent may have had against Ruby is part of his estate and must be 
administered according to the Probate Code. That section provides that upon death, both 
personal and real property devolve to those specified in the Will. Property is defined in §75-1-
201(33), to include anything that may be subject to ownership. Section 75-3-703(3), provides 
that the personal representative has the same standing to sue or be sued as the decedent. 
It is well settled that all causes of actions or claims which a decedent had at the 
time of his death are personal property and become assets of his estate. 31 Am. Jur. 2d. 
Executors and Administrators §503. This includes any right decedent may have had to enforce 
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a provision of a divorce decree. Id. 507. Rabwin v. Chotiner 249 Cal. App. 2d. 675, 57 Cal. 
Rptr. 721. 
Furthermore, Julie Mark is not a beneficiary of the property in question and thus 
her standing cannot be based thereon. Julie Mark is not a beneficiary under Joseph's Will to 
the property she claims belonged to Joseph but Ruby kept. Under the Will, Joseph devised to 
his children all his property that he had acquired an interest in before his marriage to Julie 
Mark. (R. 0122) The property in question obviously was his, if at all, prior to his marriage 
to Julie Mark. Therefore, even if Ruby turned the property over to the estate for distribution 
that she allegedly kept, none of it would go to Julie Mark. Thus, Julie Mark is merely an 
interloper, having no interest in the property in question, and as set forth above, has no right 
to assert an interest thereon on behalf of the estate. 
In Appellant's argument on standing she makes conclusory statements with no 
citation to the record and no citation to authorities to substantiate her argument as to standing. 
Instead, Appellant simply makes a conclusory statement that "there is simply no basis in law or 
fact for the trial court's determination that Julie Mark has no standing to raise the affirmative 
defenses of unclean hands". (Appellant's Brief, page 8) On the contrary, there is no question 
of fact that Julie Mark is not acting as a co-personal representative in this action but only for 
herself. The co-personal representative, Charlene Mayfield has not authorized Appellant's 
claims nor concurred with her actions. (R. 0125-0126) This is an issue only of interpretation 
of the plain language of Appellant's pleadings showing her acting for herself, the plain language 
of the will and letters testamentary and statutory law. There are no facts in dispute on this 
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issue. Since the law is clear and correctly applied by the lower court in concluding that Julie 
Mark has no standing, the Judgment should stand. 
H THE CHANGE OF BENEFICIARY FROM RUBY TO JULIE MARK IN 
VIOLATION OF THE DECREE OF DIVORCE WAS VOID AS A MATTER OF 
LAW. 
It is undisputed by the parties that Joseph changed the beneficiary on his two (2) 
insurance policies after the divorce and after he married Appellant, Julie Mark. (R.0027 and 
0055) It is further an undisputed fact that the Decree of Divorce provides that all life insurance 
policies Joseph had were to remain with Ruby as beneficiary thereon. Since Ruby has never 
remarried and is alive, paragraph 6 of the Decree of Divorce is clear in its requirement that 
Defendant is to remain the beneficiary on the policies until her death or remarriage. Thus, 
Plaintiffs attempted change of the beneficiary on his life insurance policy was a disregard for 
the Decree of Divorce and is void. 
Utah law is clear on the issue that courts will disregard a forbidden attempt to 
substitute a second wife as beneficiary on insurance policies. The leading case on the issue in 
Utah is Traveler's Insurance Company v. Lewis 531 P.2d 484 (Utah 1975). In Lewis, the 
divorce decree required the ex-wife to remain as beneficiary on the plaintiffs life insurance 
policy with the children as contingent beneficiaries in the event the ex-wife died or remarried. 
The husband remarried and changed the beneficiary to his second wife. The ex-wife remarried 
and on the husband's death, the second wife and the children both claimed to be the beneficiaries 
of his policy. The court held: 
A court of equity can and should regard as done that which ought 
to be done; and, similarly, it can and should regard as not having 
been done that which ought not to have been done. Therefore, in 
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judging the rights of these contending parties, the court should have 
disregarded the forbidden attempt to change of beneficiary whereby 
the second wife was substituted for the first wife. 
Because the ex-wife had remarried the court found the children of the marriage 
were in fact the proper beneficiaries and entitled to the money despite the attempted change by 
the husband. See also Madsen v. Estate of Moffatt. 542 P.2d 197 (Utah 1975) (Change by ex-
husband of beneficiary on life insurance policy disregarded by court and ex-wife awarded 
amount of insurance proceeds as of the date of the divorce decree). Other states have also held 
such attempted changes of beneficiary contrary to a divorce decree to be void. Johnson v. 
Hartford Insurance Group. 578 P.2d 676 (Idaho 1978) (Change of beneficiary contrary to 
divorce decree is void as a matter of public policy); Carpenter v. Carpenter. 722 P.2d 298 
(Ariz. App. 1985) (Citing extensive authority (nine cased from different states) for the 
proposition that where a divorce decree requires husband to maintain insurance policy with wife 
as beneficiary and husband dies after changing the beneficiary in violation of the divorce decree, 
the beneficiary intended by the decree is entitled to the proceeds) (citations omitted)); Pierce v. 
Pierce. 758 P.2d 252 (Kan. 1988) (Divorce decree requiring husband to keep children as 
beneficiaries precluded him from changing beneficiary when he remarried). 
Appellant does not cite nor attempt to distinguish these controlling cases. Rather, 
she claims that Ruby knew of the change in beneficiary but "sat on any rights she had to enforce 
her reinstatement as beneficiary". (Appellant's Brief, page 10) Appellant intimates that 
evidence has become obscured and it is too late to ascertain the merits of the controversy. 
However, the trial court correctly rejected these arguments. Even assuming Appellant has the 
standing to raise these issues (which Ruby contends she does not as set forth in Argument I) and 
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further assuming Ruby knew of the change (which she did not know until after the death of Mr. 
Mark (R. 0103), the argument is groundless. If it is in fact true, that Ruby refused to give 
Joseph property to which he was entitled, the claim arose over twelve (12) years ago just after 
the divorce was granted- Yet, in all those years, Joseph made no demand nor brought any court 
action to air the grievance or enforce his rights. If anyone has slept on his rights to the great 
prejudice of another, it is Joseph, to the detriment of Ruby. Joseph is deceased and can longer 
be questioned by Ruby regarding the issue. It is only now after his death that Appellant 
conveniently raises the issue that Joseph himself did not see fit to raise during the twelve (12) 
years after the divorce and before his death. His inaction speaks louder than Appellant's hollow 
argument. The only logical and consistent inference that can be made from Joseph's failure to 
raise the issue at any time before the court is that he had no reason to do so because he and 
Ruby, in fact, had no differences and he was content with the property distribution. 
Furthermore, even though Appellant claims Ruby's conduct was "unfair" and 
"inequitable" (Appellant's Brief, page 11) she gives no explanation or details but only her 
conclusion of unfairness. It would be a manifestly unjust and inequitable result to hold that 
Joseph could arrogantly disregard the Decree of Divorce and change the beneficiary to his new 
wife and then allow the new wife to argue that she is entitled to benefit from Joseph's disregard 
for the order of the court. However, this is precisely what the Appellant wishes this court and 
the lower court to do. She wishes to benefit from her husband's disregard for a binding order 
of the court, while leaving the intended beneficiary, Ruby, with nothing. This result should not 
be sanctioned by this court since to do so would sanction ex-spouses disregard for court orders 
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and allow their intended beneficiaries to gain therefrom at the expense of the party whom the 
court order was created to protect. 
This is solely an issue of law involving only the interpretation of clear Utah law 
based on the undisputed fact that the beneficiary of the policies was changed after Joseph's 
remarriage without a court order or Ruby's permission. Any changes by Joseph was void. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no question of fact regarding any of the issues before this court and the 
questions presented are solely questions of law. It is undisputed that Appellant acts for herself 
and not in her representative capacity as co-personal representative of the estate of Joseph. 
Therefore, as a matter of Utah law, she has not standing to raise the issues she has raised. 
Also, there is no question of fact as to the change of the beneficiary on the policy to that of the 
Appellant in disregard for the clear provisions of Decree of Divorce. Utah case law has settled 
matters based on these same facts and the interpretation thereof is simply a sound conclusion of 
law by the trial court which should not disturbed. 
DATED this / day of December, 1993. 
TAYLOR, ENNENGA, ADAMS & LOWE 
^ 4 - 1 ^ , 
M r^k Ferre 
Attorneys for Appellee 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Copy of Statutes 
2. Decree of Divorce 
3. Will of Joseph Mark 
4. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment 
5. Letters Testamentary 
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75-3-716. Co-representatives — When joint ac-
^ tion required. 
If two or more persons are appointed co-representa-
tives and unless the will provides otherwise, the con-
currence of a majority is required on all acts con-
nected with the administration and distribution of 
the estate. This restriction does not apply when any 
co-representative receives and receipts for property 
due the estate, when the concurrence of all cannot 
readily be obtained in the time reasonably available 
for emergency action necessary to preserve the estate, 
or when a co-representative has been delegated to act 
for the others. Persons dealing with a co-representa-
tive if actually unaware that another has been ap-
pointed to serve with him or if advised by the per-
sonal representative with whom they deal that he has 
authority to act alone for any of the reasons men-
tioned herein, are as fully protected as if the person 
with whom they dealt had been the sole personal rep-
resentative. 1975 
113 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE 75-1-201 
ject to this code as originally constituted and as it 
exists from time to time during administration. 
(12) "Exempt property" means that property of 
a decedent's estate which is described in Section 
75-2-402. 
(13) "Fiduciary" includes a personal represen-
tative, guardian, conservator, and trustee. 
(14) "Foreign personal representative" means 
a personal representative of another jurisdiction. 
(15) "Formal proceedings" means those con-
ducted before a judge with notice to interested 
persons. 
(16) "Guardian" means a person who has qual-
ified as a guardian of a minor or incapacitated 
person pursuant to testamentary or court ap-
pointment but excludes one who is merely a 
guardian ad litem. 
(17) "Heirs" means those persons, including 
the surviving spouse, who are entitled under the 
statutes of intestate succession to the property of 
a decedent. 
(18) "Incapacitated person" means any person 
whose decision making process is impaired by 
reason of mental illness, mental deficiency, phys-
ical illness or disability, chronic use of drugs, 
chronic intoxication, or other cause, except mi-
nority, or the person has unusually bad judg-
ment, highly impaired memory, or severe loss of 
behavior control, to the extent that the person is 
unable to care for his or her personal safety or is 
unable to attend to and provide for such necessi-
ties as food, shelter, clothing, and medical care, 
without which physical injury or illness may oc-
cur. 
(19) "Informal proceedings" mean those con-
ducted by an officer of the court acting as a regis-
trar for probate of a will or appointment of a per-
sonal representative. 
(20) "Interested person" includes heirs, devi-
sees, children, spouses, creditors, beneficiaries, 
and any others having a property right in or 
claim against a trust estate or the estate of a 
decedent, ward, or protected person which may 
be affected by the proceeding. It also includes 
persons having priority for appointment as per-
sonal representative and other fiduciaries repre-
senting interested persons. The meaning as it re-
lates to particular persons may vary from time to 
time and must be determined according to the 
particular purposes of, and matters involved in, 
any proceeding. 
(21) "Issue" of a person means all his lineal 
descendants of all generations, with the relation-
ship of parent and child at each generation being 
determined by the definitions of child and parent 
contained in this code. 
(22) "Lease" includes an oil, gas, or other min-
eral lease. 
(23) "Letters" includes letters testamentary, 
letters of guardianship, letters of administration, 
and letters of conservatorship. 
(24) "Minor" means a person who is under 18 
years of age. 
(25) "Mortgage" means any conveyance, 
agreement, or arrangement in which property is 
used as security. 
(26) "Nonresident decedent" means a decedent 
who was domiciled in another jurisdiction at the 
time of death. 
(27) "Organization" includes a corporation, 
government, or governmental subdivision or 
agency, business trust, estate, trust, partnership 
or association, two or more persons having a joint 
or common interest, or any other legal entity. 
(28) "Parent" includes any person entitled to 
take, or who would be entitled to take, if the 
child died without a will, as a parent under this 
code by intestate succession from the child whose 
relationship is in question and excludes any per-
son who is only a stepparent, foster parent, or 
grandparent. 
(29) "Person" means an individual, a corpora-
tion, an organization, or other legal entity. 
(30) "Personal representative" includes execu-
tor, administrator, successor personal represen-
tative, special administrator, and persons who 
perform substantially the same function under 
the law governing their status; but "general per-
sonal representative" excludes special adminis-
trator. 
(31) "Petition" means a written request to the 
court for an order after notice. 
(32) "Proceeding" includes action at law and 
suit in equity. 
(33) "Property" includes both real and per-
sonal property or any interest therein and means 
anything that may be the subject of ownership. 
(34) "Protected person" means a minor or 
other person for whom a conservator has been 
appointed or other protective order has been 
made. 
(35) "Protective proceeding" means a proceed-
ing under the provisions of Section 75-5-401 to 
determine that a person cannot effectively man-
age or apply the person's estate to necessary 
ends, either because the person lacks the ability 
or is otherwise inconvenienced, or because the 
person is a minor, and to secure administration 
of the person's estate by a conservator or other 
appropriate relief. 
(36) "Registrar" refers to the official of the 
court designated to perform the functions of reg-
istrar as provided in Section 75-1-307. 
(37) "Security" includes any note, stock, trea-
sury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebt-
edness, certificate of interest, or participation in 
an oil, gas, or mining title or lease or in pay-
ments out of production under such a title or 
lease, collateral trust certificate, transferable 
share, voting trust certificate, or, in general, any 
interest or instrument commonly known as a se-
curity, or any certificate of interest or participa-
tion, any temporary or interim certificate, re-
ceipt, or certificate of deposit for, or any warrant 
or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the 
foregoing. 
(38) "Settlement," in reference to a decedent's 
estate, includes the full process of administra-
tion, distribution, and closing. 
(39) "Special administrator" means a personal 
representative as described in Sections 75-3-614 
through 75-3-618. 
(40) "State" includes any state of the United 
States, the District of Columbia, the Common-
wealth of Puerto Rico, and any territory or pos-
session subject to the legislative authority of the 
United States. 
(41) "Successor personal representative" 
means a personal representative, other than a 
special administrator, who is appointed to suc-




75-3-101. Devolution of estate at death — Re-
strictions. 
The power of a person to leave property by will and 
the rights of creditors, devisees, and heirs to his prop-
erty are subject to the restrictions and limitations 
contained in this code to facilitate the prompt settle-
ment of estates. Upon the death of a person his real 
and personal property devolves to persons to whom' it 
is devised by his last will or to those indicated as 
substitutes for them in cases involving lapse, renun-
ciation, or other circumstances affecting the devolu-
tion of testate estate, or in the absence of testamen-
tary disposition, to his heirs, or to those indicated as 
substitutes for them in cases involving renunciation 
or other circumstances affecting devolution of intes-
tate estates, subject to homestead allowance, exempt 
property and family allowance, rights of creditors, 
elective share of the surviving spouse, and adminis-
tration. 1975 
75-3-703. General duties — Relation a n d liabil-
ity to persons interested in estate — 
Standing to sue. 
(1) A personal representative is a fiduciary who 
shall observe the standard of care applicable to 
trustees as described by Section 75-7-302. A personal 
representative is under a duty to settle and distribute 
the estate of the decedent in accordance with the 
terms of any probated and effective will and this code 
and as expeditiously and efficiently as is consistent 
with the best interests of the estate. He shall use the 
authority conferred upon him by this code, the terms 
of the will, if any, and any order in proceedings to 
which he is party for the best interests of successors 
to the estate. 
(2) A personal representative shall not be sur-
charged for acts of administration or distribution if 
the conduct, in question was authorized at the time. 
Subject to other obligations of administration, an in-
formally probated will is authority to administer and 
distribute the estate according to its terms. An order 
of appointment of a personal representative, whether 
issued in informal or formal proceedings, is authority 
to distribute apparently intestate assets to the heirs 
of the decedent if, at the time of distribution, the per-
sonal representative is not aware of a pending testacy 
proceeding, a proceeding to vacate an order entered 
in an earlier testacy proceeding, a formal proceeding 
questioning his appointment or fitness to continue, or 
a supervised administration proceeding. Nothing in 
this section affects the duty of the personal represen-
tative to administer and distribute the estate in ac-
cordance with the rights of claimants, the surviving 
spouse, any minor and dependent children, and any 
pretermitted child of the decedent as described else-
where in this code. 
(3) Except as to proceedings which do not survive 
the death of the decedent, a personal representative 
of a decedent domiciled in this state at his death has 
the same standing to sue and be sued in the courts of 
this state and courts of any other jurisdiction as his 
decedent had immediately prior to death. 1975 
75-3-714. Transactions authorized for personal 
representat ives — Exceptions. 
Except as restricted or otherwise provided by this 
code, by the will or by an order in a formal proceeding 
and subject to the priorities stated in Section 
75-3-902^ a personal representative, acting reason-
ably for the benefit of the interested persons, may 
properly: 
(1) retain assets owned by the decedent pend-
ing distribution or liquidation including those in 
which the representative is personally interested 
or which are otherwise improper for trust invest-
ment; 
(17) effect a fair and reasonable compromise 
with any debtor or obligor, or extend, renew, or 
in any manner modify the terms of any obliga-
tion owing to the estate. If the personal represen-
tative holds a mortgage, pledge, or other lien 
upon property of another person, he may, in lieu 
of foreclosure, accept a conveyance or transfer of 
encumbered assets from the owner thereof in sat-
isfaction of the indebtedness secured by lien; 
(22) prosecute or defend claims or proceedings 
in any jurisdiction for the protection of the estate 
and of the personal representative in the perfor-
mance of his duties; 
(23) sell, mortgage, or lease any real or per-
sonal property of the estate or any interest in it 
for cash, credit, or for part cash and part credit, 
and with or without security for unpaid balances: 
NOLAN J. OLSEN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
8138 South State Street 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
255-7176 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOSEPH MARK, 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Plaintiff, : 
-vs- * ^ 
RUBY MARK, : 
Civil No. D-79-1797 
Defendant. : 
|| The above entitled matter came on for trial on the 7th day of January, 
(J 1980, before this court, the Honorable Christine M.Durham, Judge presiding, 
I plaintiff appearing in person and by his attorney, Nolan J. Olsen, and 
defendant appearing in person and by her attorney, Brant H. Wall, and 
jl plaintiff having testified concerning the allegations of his Complaint, and 
i 
J defendant having testified concerning the allegations of her Counterclaim, 
and the court having been fully advised in the premises, and the court having 
I heretofore made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and 
. upon motion of Nolan J. Olsen, attorney for plaintiff, 
j! IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That the bonds of matrimony heretofore existing between the 
!; 
jj plaintiff, JOSEPH MARK, and the defendant, RUBY MARK, be, and the same are 
hereby dissolved, which Decree shall be, and the same becomes final upon entry. 
I 2. Plaintiff be, and he is hereby awarded as his sole and separate 
}i 
!i property the real property, exclusive of the home and a parcel of ground 
ii 
I' 6 7 f x 165', said property being approximately one and one-half acres located 
|< | at 206 East 8000 South, Midvale, Utah; the 1971 Ford pickup; sewing machine; 
h 
brass bed; tools and personal belongings; and 185.18 shares of Standard Oil 
of California common stock. In addition thereto, plaintiff be, and he is hereby 
awarded as his sole and separate property a color television (to be chosen by 
defendant) and a freezer (to be chosen by plaintiff). 
3. Defendant be, and she is hereby awarded as her sole and separate 
i! 
Ijproperty the 1967 Cougar automobile; furniture, furnishings and fixtures, 
'exclusive of items awarded to plaintiff; 977.82 shares of Standard Oil of 
I California common stock; and her personal belongings. In addition thereto, 
| defendant be, and she is hereby awarded, in lieu of alimony, the parties' 
residence located at 206 East 8000 South, Midvale, Utah, together with a parcel 
of land around said home 67' x 165f. 
I 4. It is hereby ordered that the following personal property be sold, 
to-wit: 1976 Harley-Davidson motorcycle, 1978 Harley-Davidson motorcycle, 1973 
MHonda motorcycle, Corvair automobile, camp trailer and camper shell; and from 
! the proceeds of said sale, it is hereby ordered that the following debts and 
obligations be paid, to-wit: Sears, approximately $400.00; Walker Bank, 
{approximately $2,800.00; and Standard Oil Credit Union, approximately $6,200.00. 
In the event there are any proceeds remaining after the payment of the above 
debts, it is hereby ordered that said parties divide any excess equally. In the 
| event either party desires to purchase any of the above items, a value may be 
•(agreed upon between the parties and the other party may purchase the one-half 
interest with cash to be applied to the debts indicated, or, in the alternative, 
J to assume a debt of like amount. In the event no agreement as to value or 
distribution can be agreed upon between the parties, it is hereby ordered that 
the items be sold. 
|| 5. Plaintiff be, and he is hereby ordered to assume and pay the 
obligation due ContinentaIBank & Trust, approximately $3,200.00. 
11* 6. Plaintiff be, and he is hereby awarded his life insurance policies, 
I with defendant to remain as beneficiary thereon until such time as she dies or 
remarries, whichever occurs first. 
jl 7. Plaintiff be, and he is hereby ordered to pay one-half of defen-
dant's medical expenses during the period she is not covered by medical 
• insurance and until she reaches the age of 65 and is eligible for Medicare 
I coverage. 
II 8. Plaintiff be, and he is hereby ordered to pay to defendant's 
counsel the sum of $800.00 to apply toward his attorney fees. In the event 
plaintiff has not paid said sum by April 2, 2930, then defendant may submit 
her affidavit that said sum has not been paid, and defendant may be granted 
judgment as against plaintiff for the sum of $800.00. 
9. Each party be, and they are hereby ordered to execute such deeds 
and other documents, titles, etc., as may be necessary in regard to this 
action, including arranging sales of items ordered sold. 
10. It is hereby ordered that the terms of the temporary Order continue 
through January, 1980. 
is 7?%- day of TfUti^ DATED t h  , 1980. 
J U D G E 
I Approved as to form: 
BR^tfT H. WALL, Attorney for Defendant 
Judge Building 
t Lake City, Utah 84111 
v / 
* ATTEST 
W. STRUNG HVAMS 
STATE OF UTAH ) COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, THE UNDERSIGNED. CLERK OF THE DISTRICT 
COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY. UTAH, DO HEREBY 
CERTIFY THAT THE ANNEXED AND FOREGOING IS 
A TRUE AND FULL COPY OF AN ORIGINAL DOCU-
MENT ON FILE IN MY OFFICEjkS SUCH CfeERK. 
WITj^WfifigMY HAND AN6/SEAL OF ^KlD Qpqrf 
T H I S - c ^ Z t o A Y O F r t y f a \ A \ 19-
H. DOIOHHINDLEY, CLERfC U J 
«Ss> 
LAST Wil l i AW TESTAMENT 
Of 
JOSEPH MARK 
I, JOSEPH MARK, presently residing at Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
and I being of sound and disposing mind and memory and not acting under duress, 
menace, fraud or undue influence of any person whatsoever, hereby declare this 
to be my Last Will and Testament, revoking all previous wills, codicils to 
wills and papers testamentary at any time heretofore by me. 
ARTICXE I 
I, JOSEPH MARK, declare that I am married and that my wife's name is 
JULIE CHRISTINA MACLEAN MARK and that we have no children as issue of this 
marriage. 
I, JOSEPH MARK, further declare that I have three (3) children of a 
previous marriage, who are now living, whose names are: 
Bonnie Lee Pidcock 
Charlene Mayfield 
Jay Joe Mark 
ARTICLE II 
I hereby direct that the expense of my last illness, funeral, burial 
and all of my just debts and obligations and the cost and expense of admin-
istering my estate, including all taxes, fees and other charges, be paid and 
discharged as soon as can conveniently be paid after my decease by my personal 
representative hereinafter named. 
ARTICLE III 
A. I hereby give, devise and bequeath to my wife, JULIE CHRISTINA 
MACLEAN MARK, any and all property we acquire jointly after the date of our 
marriage on May 2, 1981, including real property, furniture, furnishings and 
fixtures and other personal prperty, as well as any savings or checking 
accounts which we hold in both of our names. I also hereby give, devise and . 
bequeath to my wife; JULIE CHRISTINA MACLEAN MARK, the mobile hone located at 
Winchester Estates Mobile Home Park, Salt Lake County, Utah. I hereby give, 
devise and bequeath to my wife, JULIE CHRISTINA MACLEAN MARK, one-half (1/2) of 
my real property which I may have at the time of my death which I acquired 
prior to our marriage on May 2, 1981. 
B. I give, devise and bequeath to my children, BONNIE LEE PIDOOCK, 
CHARLENE MAYFIELD and JAY JOE MARK, to be divided equally one-half (1/2) of my 
real property acquired prior to my narriage on May 2, 1981, as well as any 
savings accounts, stocks, automobiles, motorcycles, or other property which I 
acquired prior to my marriage on May 2, 1981. In the event of any of my 
children shall predeceases me, then in that event, the living lawful issue of 
said deceased child shall receive the share of said deceased child. Each share 
set aside for the issue of a deceased child shall be distributed to such issue 
upon the principle of representation. 
ARTICLE IV 
I have, except as otherwise provided in this will intentionally and 
with full knowledge omitted to provide for my other heirs who nay be living at 
the tijne of my death, including the person, or persons, who may, after the 
date of this will, become my heir, or heirs, by reason of marriage or other-
wise. 
ARTICLE V 
Should any part, clause, provision or condition of this will be held 
to be void and/or inoperative, then I direct that such invalidity shall not 
affect any other clause, provisions and/or condition hereof, but the remainder 
of this will shall be effective as though such void clause, provision and/or 
condition had not been contained herein. 
ARHOU2 VI 
I hereby nominate, constitute and appoint JULIE CHRISTINA MACLEAN MARK 
and CHARLENE MAYFIELD, joint personal representatives of this, my Last Will and 
Testament, to serve without bond. 
IN WITNESS WHERBOF, I sign my name to this, my Last Will and Testament, 
on this IQJ^ day Qt^rfjPitsjyiJ^pi , 198ff, at Midvale, Utah; and being 
first duly sworn, do hereby declare to the undersigned Notary that I sign and 
execute this instrument as my Last Will and that I sign it willingly, that I 
execute it as my free and voluntary act for the purposes expressed in it, that 
I am eighteen (18) years of age or older, of sound mind and under no con-
straint or undue influence. 
g^^^^^s^A^ JOSEPH 
stater 
We, the attesting witnesses, sign our names to this instrument, con-
sisting of three (3) pages including the page signed by us, being first duly 
sworn, and do hereby declare to the undersigned Notary that the testator 
signs and executes this instrument as his Last Will and that he signs it 
willingly and that each of us in the presence and hearing of the testator and 
of each other, hereby signs this Will as witness to the testator's signing 
i 
and that to the best of our knowledge, the testator is eighteen (18) years of 
age or older, of sound mind and under no constraint or undue influence. 
aB^fe^<»V J ^ i / ^ ^ g g i d i n g at: ^gg3 Ma^^£^^S/~-
Z/?£* r O ^ 7 ^ W 2 
Residing at: 
STATE OF t/TAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Subscribed/ sworn to and acknowledged before me by the testator and 
by the vdtnesses named herein on this j ^ f day of \^/)JL£LS. , 198fi 
NJffftRYdPySLIC 
Residing At 
My Commission Expires: 
A 
s^f^^^^^ 
FOES DISTRICT CWRT 
Third Judicial District 
L. Mark Ferre, #1065 
TAYLOR, ENNENGA, ADAMS & LOWE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant 
2180 South 1300 East, Suite 520 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone: (801) 486-1112 
JUN ? 1993 
OtputyCbrfe 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 












FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 920906941 
Judge: Leslie A. Lewis 
-oooOooo-
The Motion of the Plaintiff for Summary Judgment and the Motion of the 
Defendant for Summary Judgment in the above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing 
before the above-entitled Court on April 29, 1993, at 2:00 p.m. before the Honorable Leslie A. 
Lewis. The Plaintiff was present and represented by her counsel, L. Mark Ferre of TAYLOR, 
ENNENGA, ADAMS & LOWE, the Defendant was present and represented by her counsel, 
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Martin Tanner of HOWE & TANNER. The Court having heard argument on Plaintiff and 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and the Court having taken the Motions under 
advisement, and the Court having reviewed the Motions and Memorandums in Support, and 
Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum now hereby enters its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Court finds that the following are the material facts and there are no genuine 
issues relative thereto. 
1. Ruby Mark and Joseph Mark were divorced in 1980. 
2. The Decree of Divorce awarded Joseph Mark ownership of his two life 
insurance policies but required Ruby Mark to remain as beneficiary thereon until she remarried 
or died. 
3. The Decree of Divorce has never been modified. 
4. Ruby is alive and never remarried. 
5. Shortly after the divorce, Joseph Mark married Defendant, Julie Mark. 
6. In 1986, Joseph Mark changed the beneficiary on his two life insurance 
policies to Julie Mark. 
7. The amount of the death benefit on the two life insurance policies was the 
same on the date of death as it was at the time of the divorce. 
8. Joseph Mark died in 1991 and both Ruby Mark and Julie Mark have made 
claim on the life insurance proceeds. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Julie Mark has no standing to raise issues of alleged non-compliance with 
the Decree of Divorce by Plaintiff, Ruby Mark. All such issues now must be raised by the 
Personal Representatives of Mr. Mark's estate. 
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2. Any change in the Decree of Divorce between Ruby Mark and Joseph 
Mark must be made by this Court. 
3. No changes in the Decree of Divorce were ever made by this Court. 
4. Any attempt by Joseph Mark to change the beneficiary on the two life 
insurance policies is void. 
5. The proceeds of the two life insurance policies belong to Ruby Mark. 
DATED this 
District Court Judge 
ICEP7IFY THAT THIS l&ATP'^ r,C-
STA.L. 
"ATE: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the ~QD day of May, 1993, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was sent via facsimile 
and mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Martin S. Tanner, Esq. 
HOWE & TANNER 
Attorney for Julie Mark 
5284 South 320 West, Suite C-274 
Murray, Utah 84107 
3fflM>/& , 
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L. Mark Ferre, #1065 
TAYLOR, ENNENGA, ADAMS & LOWE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant 
2180 South 1300 East, Suite 520 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 










Civil No. 920906941 
Judge: Leslie A. Lewis 
-oooOooo 
The Court, having previously entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
on Plaintiff and Defendant's Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, the Court now hereby 
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. 
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2. Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and the proceeds from 
the two life insurance policies on the life of Joseph Mark belong to Ruby Mark and Defendant, 
Julie Mark, has no interest therein. 
DATED this _ 7 _ ^ d a y o T May, 1993 
B^THE COURT: 
Honorable Leslie A. 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the <C$£) day of May, 1993, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing SUMMARY JUDGMENT was sent via facsimile and mailed, postage prepaid, 
to the following: 
Martin S. Tanner, Esq. 
HOWE & TANNER 
Attorney for Julie Mark 
5284 South 320 West, Suite C-274 
Murray, Utah 84107 
:EPTIFY THAT THIS J? ^ Y'"- ••'•'- \ 
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Thomas Chris tensen, J r . , A0650 W28Wttl$T£0ft£fr 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, ThW Ju#C**l D^frW 
a Profess ional Corporation 
Attorneys for Personal Representat ive APft3 a 1QM 
Twelfth Floor ' * ^ ' 
215 South S t a t e S t r e e t _ JWW«C0UWV 
P,0. Box 510210 ^ ±y-,^,*^,A,^ -
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 w**a**' 
Telephone: (801) 531-8900 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 




Case No. q^ttOOtte?. 
1. Julie M. Mark and Charlene Mayfield were duly 
appointed and qualified as General Personal Representatives of 
the estate of the above named decedent on the ^9 day of 
—&/AAX , 1992, by the Court, vrth all authority pertainim 
thereto, 
2. Administration of the estate is unsupervised. 
These letters are issued to evidence the appointment, 
qualification, and authority of the said personal representative 
WITNESS, my signature and the Seal of this Court, this 
^ . day of tytAAJ? . 1992. 
i^ eo-rii-^ ,,. s^gA. Clerk of * the Court 
BSHWHH ^ - - — 
DATE,. tZeA^'j? m soa? 
^ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the / day of December, 1993, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Martin S. Tanner, #4419 
HOWE & TANNER 
340 Broadway Centre 
111 East Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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